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The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax: A
Critique and Exploration of Alternatives*
John M. Janiga**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tax Reform Act of 19861 repealed the corporate add-on
minimum tax and replaced it with a corporate alternative mini-
mum tax ("AMT").2 According to both the House Ways and
Means Committee Report and the Senate Finance Committee Re-
port, the corporate AMT was designed to "serve one overriding
objective: to ensure that no taxpayer with substantial economic
income can avoid significant tax liability by using exclusions, de-
ductions, and credits."3
* Copyright ©1988 by John M. Janiga. All rights reserved.
** Instructor of Accounting, Loyola University of Chicago; B.B.A., 1979, M.B.A.,
1982, J.D., 1988, Loyola University of Chicago; C.P.A., 1981 (Illinois). This article was
adapted from a paper prepared for the Senior Tax Seminar at Loyola University of Chi-
cago School of Law. The author would like to thank his wife, Angie, for her patience and
assistance in typing and proofreading numerous drafts of this article. The author also
would like to thank Professor Jeffery L. Kwall for reading earlier drafts of the manuscript
and offering suggestions. The views expressed are those of the author.
1. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701, 100 Stat. 2320 (1986). Sec-
tion 2(a) of the 1986 Act redesignated the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986. Unless otherwise indicated, references to sections are to the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended [hereinafter the Code].
2. See infra notes 3-29 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the corpo-
rate AMT. The corporate AMT provisions are effective for tax years beginning after
December 31, 1986. I.R.C. §§ 55-59. For an analysis of the technical rules and mechani-
cal aspects of calculating the corporate AMT, see Feinberg & Robinson, The Corporate
Alternative Minimum Tax.: Working With BURP While Waiting for ACE, 15 J. CORP.
TAX'N 3 (1988); Gould, The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax: A Search for Equity
Through a Maze of Complexity, 64 TAXES 783 (1986); Haspel & Wertlieb, New Law
Makes Sweeping Changes to Corporate Minimum Tax, 66 J. TAX'N 22 (1987); Odmark &
Tillman, Corporate AMT Rules Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 17 TAX ADVISER 656
(1986).
3. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 518 (1986) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT];
H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 305-06 (1985) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
Although the legislative history does not define the term "economic income," the House
Ways and Means Committee apparently equated it with financial statement income. The
Committee stated that "[w]ith respect to the taxation of corporations, both the perception
and reality of fairness have been harmed by instances in which major companies have
paid no taxes in years when they reported substantial earnings [i.e., financial statement
income] ...." HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 306. For a discussion of the distinctions be-
tween financial statement, taxable, and economic income, see infra note 7.
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Prior to 1986, the regular corporate tax was supplemented by an
add-on minimum tax.4 The corporate add-on minimum tax was in
the nature of an excise tax.' Essentially, it imposed a fifteen per-
cent tax on certain corporate tax preferences 6 that was paid in ad-
dition to the regular corporate income tax. Despite the existence
of the corporate add-on minimum tax, many corporations that re-
ported substantial financial statement incomes paid little or no
tax.7 Consequently, Congress began to perceive the corporate add-
4. Congress enacted the first corporate minimum tax in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487 (1969). Congress
wanted to prevent corporations from escaping tax on all or a large portion of their eco-
nomic incomes through the use of various deductions and exclusions. S. REP. No. 552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2142.
The 1969 Act created an add-on minimum tax on certain tax preferences that was paid
in addition to any regular tax liability. I.R.C. §§ 56-58 (1969). The tax was computed by
multiplying the minimum tax base by the minimum tax rate of ten percent. I.R.C.
§ 56(a) (1969). The minimum tax base was the total specified tax preferences less the
regular tax liability and an exemption amount of $30,000. Id. The specified tax prefer-
ence items for corporations included accelerated depreciation on real property, amortiza-
tion of certified pollution control facilities, excess reserves for losses on bad debts for
certain financial institutions, excess depletion deductions, and a percentage of capital
gains. I.R.C. § 57 (1969).
Subsequent to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress attempted to increase the effec-
tiveness of the add-on minimum tax provisions through a series of modifications. For
example, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301, 90 Stat. 1549 (1976),
increased the minimum tax rate from ten to fifteen percent, and redefined the minimum
tax base as total preferences reduced by the greater of the regular tax or $10,000. I.R.C.
§ 56(a)(1976).
For further discussion of the corporate add-on minimum tax, see generally Hevener,
Minimum Tax and Alternative Minimum Tax - Computation and Application, Tax
Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 288-3d (1987). See also Hobbet, Minimum Tax on Prefer-
ence Items: An Analysis of a Complex New Concept, 32 J. TAX'N 194 (1970); Mansfield,
Galvin, & Craig, Minimum Tax and Tax Burden Adjustments, 23 TAX LAW. 591 (1970);
Schenk, Minimum Tax for Tax Preferences, 48 TAXES 201 (1970).
5. An excise tax is a "[tiax laid on manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities
or upon ... corporate privileges." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (5th ed. 1979).
6. The term "corporate tax preferences" generally refers to any exclusions, deduc-
tions, and credits available to a corporation as a means for reducing its income tax
liability.
7. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 519; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 306-07.
The reason for this result lies in the distinction between financial statement income and
taxable income. The determination of financial statement (or book) income is normally
based upon generally accepted accounting principles, and the objective is to measure op-
erating results as accurately as possible. W. MEIGS & R. MEIGS, ACCOUNTING: THE
BASIS FOR BUSINESS DECISIONS 736 (6th ed. 1987). In contrast, taxable income is de-
fined by Congress to meet the government's revenue needs and to achieve certain eco-
nomic, social, political, and equity objectives. W. HOFFMAN & W. RAABE, WEST'S
FEDERAL TAXATION: CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES, AND TRUSTS 1-2-15
(1988). As a result of differing rules, many corporations reported substantial financial
statement incomes, but had little or no taxable incomes. To illustrate, a 1986 study by
the Citizens for Tax Justice reported that 42 of the 250 largest U.S. corporations earned
large financial statement incomes but paid, on average, no income taxes in the period
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on minimum tax as an inadequate solution to these tax avoidance
situations. Congress focused upon two reasons for this failure.
First, the tax was not designed to define a comprehensive income
base. Second, the tax failed to measure adequately economic
income.
The corporate AMT attempts to cure the perceived defects in
the corporate add-on minimum tax by expanding and redefining
the minimum tax base. 9 The expansion and redefinition of the
minimum tax base is accomplished primarily by creating a new
category of items referred to as "adjustments."' 0
The key feature of the AMT structure is the inclusion of a "spe-
cial adjustment" in the minimum tax base. For taxable years be-
ginning in 1987, 1988, and 1989, this special adjustment is referred
to as the business untaxed reported profits ("BURP") or book in-
come adjustment." Basically, the BURP adjustment is equal to
fifty percent of the amount by which a corporation's financial state-
ment income exceeds its regular taxable income.12 The amount so
calculated becomes part of the minimum tax base. 3
For taxable years beginning in 1990, the BURP adjustment is
from 1981 through 1985. Group Lists 42 Firms That on Average Paid No US. Income
Tax, Wall St. J., July 18, 1986, at 9, col. 4.
A third measure of income is economic income (sometimes referred to as "economic
profits"). Generally, economic income is similar to financial statement income with one
major exception. In deriving financial statement income, no cost charges are made for
risk taking and use of owners' capital. Such costs are subtracted, however, in deriving
economic income. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 181-82 (6th ed. 1981).
8. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 519; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 306.
9. See infra note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the changes to the
minimum tax base. The corporate AMT also increased the minimum tax rate from 15%
to 20%. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A).
10. See infra note 24 for a listing of the adjustments. The minimum tax base was
broadened in two other ways. First, many preferences under the add-on minimum tax
structure were expanded. For example, the preferences for accelerated depreciation and
intangible drilling costs were made applicable to all corporations. I.R.C. §§ 57(a)(2),
57(a)(7). Second, new preferences were added, including certain tax-exempt interest and
percentage of completion income for corporations using the completed contract method.
I.R.C. §§ 56(a)(3), 57(a)(5).
11. The reference to the adjustment as business untaxed reported profits is contained
in the Senate and Conference Reports. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 529; H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-272 (1986) [hereinafter CONFERENCE RE-
PORT]. The Code, however, refers to the adjustment as book income. See infra notes 30-
33 and accompanying text for a technical description of the BURP adjustment. The
BURP adjustment does not apply to any S corporation, real estate investment trust, regu-
lated investment company, or real estate mortgage investment conduit ("REMIC").
I.R.C. § 56(f)(4); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.56-IT(a)(2) (1988).
12. See I.R.C. § 56(f)(1). See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text for a more
technical definition of the BURP adjustment.
13. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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scheduled to be replaced with the adjusted current earnings
("ACE") adjustment. 14 Under the ACE adjustment, the minimum
tax base essentially will be increased or decreased by seventy-five
percent of the difference between a corporation's taxable income
and its "adjusted" earnings. 15
Section 702 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 directs the Treasury
to study and report to Congress on the operation and effect of the
BURP adjustment and the ACE adjustment (as projected) by Jan-
uary 1, 1989.16 Based on the results of this study, Congress pre-
sumably will decide the fate of the BURP and ACE adjustments.17
Therefore, it is worth analyzing the merits of the BURP and ACE
adjustments and the options confronting Congress.
The BURP and ACE adjustments raise serious policy issues and
practical concerns. 8 The primary problems with the BURP ad-
justment are its reliance on generally accepted accounting princi-
ples ("GAAP"), the pressure it places on accountants to
understate financial statement income, and compliance difficulties.
The most significant problem with the ACE adjustment is that it
exacerbates BURP's compliance concerns. Part II of this article
explores these issues and concerns. 19
Given the problems inherent in the BURP and ACE adjust-
ments, Congress should examine other alternatives for dealing with
the problem of corporate tax avoidance. Part III of this article
discusses these alternatives and offers suggestions as to the best
course of action.2°
14. I.R.C. § 56(g). Like the BURP adjustment, the ACE adjustment does not apply
to any S corporation, real estate investment trust, regulated investment company, or
REMIC. I.R.C. § 56(g)(6).
15. See I.R.C. § 56(g)(1). See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of the ACE adjustment.
16. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 702, 100 Stat. 2320, 2345 (1986).
See also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 11-279; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 461-62 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK].
17. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the options avail-
able to Congress.
18. It should be noted that the BURP and ACE adjustments also raise serious techni-
cal problems. These problems are not explored in this article. For a discussion of some
of these technical problems, see generally B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND' SHAREHOLDERS 5-50 (example 5) (5th ed. 1987);
Committees on Alternative Minimum Tax and Corporations of the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section, The Senate's Proposed Book Income Minimum Tax Preferences,
32 TAX NOTES 569, 570 (1986) [hereinafter Committees on AMT]; Gould, supra note 2,
at 796-97.
19. See infra notes 21-70 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
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II. THE SPECIAL ADJUSTMENT APPROACH: POLICY ISSUES
AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS
A. The Corporate AMT Structure 21
The corporate AMT is equal to the excess, if any, of the tenta-
tive minimum tax ("TMT") over the regular tax22 for the taxable
year. If the TMT exceeds the regular tax, a corporation's total
tax liability is represented by the TMT. If not, a corporation's to-
tal tax liability is equal to its regular tax.
The starting point for computing the TMT is the corporation's
regular taxable income. This amount is then adjusted for various
items, including the BURP or ACE adjustment, 24 and increased by
items of tax preference, 2 resulting in alternative minimum taxable
21. A number of articles examine the intricacies of the AMT structure. See, e.g.,
Leder, Giving Rise to BURPs (And Other Preferences) Under the New Corporate
Minimum Tax: Selected Aspects, 40 TAX LAW. 557 (1987); Hevener, supra note 4, at A-
43.
22. The "regular tax" means the regular tax liability as defined in § 26(b), less the
foreign tax credit under § 27(a). I.R.C. § 55(c)(1). Regular tax liability is the tax im-
posed by Chapter 1 with certain exceptions. See I.R.C. § 26(b). Among the exceptions
are the accumulated earnings tax, the personal holding company tax, and the minimum
tax. I.R.C. §§ 26(b)(2)(E), 26(b)(2)(F), 26(b)(2)(A).
23. I.R.C. § 55(a). The basic AMT calculation can be illustrated as follows:
Regular taxable income
+/- Adjustments per Code sections 56 and 58 (including BURP and ACE)
+ Preferences per Code section 57
= Alternative Minimum Taxable Income (AMTI)
-- $40,000 exemption amount (reduced by 25% of AMTI over $150,000)
X 20% tax rate
-- AMT foreign tax credit
= Tentative Minimum Tax (TMT)
-- Regular tax liability
= Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)
See I.R.C. §§ 55-59. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text for a further explana-
tion of this calculation.
24. I.R.C. § 56. The adjustments include: depreciation for tangible property placed
in service after December 31, 1986; mining exploration and development costs; use of the
completed contract method of accounting; deduction for certified pollution control facili-
ties; deduction for merchant marine capital construction funds; use of the installment
method; deduction for certain tax-exempt insurance providers; alternative minimum tax
net operating loss ("AMT NOL") deduction; and the BURP adjustment. Id. Effective
for taxable years beginning in 1990, the ACE adjustment is scheduled to replace the
BURP adjustment. I.R.C. §§ 56(c)(1)(B), 56(g).
25. I.R.C. § 57. The preferences include: excess deduction for depletion; excess de-
duction for intangible drilling costs; reserves for losses on bad debts of financial institu-
tions; tax-exempt interest on certain bonds; excess appreciated property charitable
deduction; and depreciation deduction for certain property placed in service before Janu-
ary 1, 1987. Id.
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income ("AMTI"). 26 The TMT is then calculated by applying the
corporate AMT rate of twenty percent 27 to the excess of the
AMTI, over an exemption amount, 28 and reduced by the AMT
foreign tax credit.29
B. The BURP Adjustment
A corporation's BURP adjustment30 is calculated as fifty percent
of the excess of its adjusted net book income ("ANBI") over its
tentative AMTI. 3' ANBI is generally the net book income or loss
shown on the corporation's applicable financial statement.32 Ten-
26. I.R.C. § 55(a).
27. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A).
28. I.R.C. § 55(d)(2). If a corporation's AMTI is $150,000 or less, the first $40,000
of AMTI is exempt. Id. The exemption amount is phased out by twenty-five percent of
AMTI in excess of $150,000. I.R.C. § 55(d)(3). As a result, a full phase out of the
exemption occurs when AMTI reaches $310,000 (Le., (310,000-150,000) x 25% =
40,000). I.R.C. § 55(d)(3)(A).
29. I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(1). The amount of foreign taxes accrued or paid during the year
available to offset TMT is limited to ninety percent of the TMT determined without
regard to the AMT foreign tax credit. See I.R.C. § 59(a)(2).
30. The reference to BURP as an adjustment is a misnomer. It is more appropriately
viewed as a preference, as the Staff of the Joint Committee implicitly recognized. BLUE
BOOK, supra note 16, at 448. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that
preferences can only increase AMTI, whereas adjustments can either increase or decrease
AMTI. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(2). The BURP adjustment operates like a preference because
it can only increase AMTI. See I.R.C. § 56(f)(1). The ACE adjustment is a true adjust-
ment in that it can increase or decrease AMTI. See infra note 56.
31. I.R.C. § 56(f)(1); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.56-IT(a) (1988). The calculation of the
BURP adjustment is illustrated by the following schedule:
X Y
(1) ANBI $100 $100
(2) AMTI (before BURP adjustment) 50 (50)
(3) Excess ((1) - (2)) 50 150
(4) BURP Adjustment (1/2 x (3)) 25 75
(5) AMTI ((2) + (4)) 75 25
32. I.R.C. § 56(f)(2)(A). The Code defines the term "applicable financial statement"
and provides priority rules for determining the statement that a corporation must use in
computing the BURP adjustment:
(A) IN GENERAL.-The term "applicable financial statement" means, with
respect to any taxable year, any statement covering such taxable year-
(i) which is required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission,
(ii) which is a certified audited income statement to be used for the pur-
poses of a statement or report -
(I) for credit purposes,
(II) to shareholders, or
(III) for any other substantial nontax purpose,
(iii) which is an income statement required to be provided to -
(I) the Federal Government or any agency thereof,
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tative AMTI consists of AMTI before the BURP adjustment and
any AMT net operating loss ("NOL") deduction. 33
1. Shortcomings of the GAAP Standard
The primary problem with the BURP adjustment is that it de-
rives from financial statement income which often is determined in
accordance with GAAP.3 4  Relying on GAAP-based financial
statement income is problematic because a number of alternative
accounting methods meet GAAP requirements, and because sub-
jective judgment is often necessary in applying GAAP. As a re-
sult, similarly situated corporations may pay different income taxes
simply because of accounting choices and the subjective judgments
of their accountants. 35 This result is suspect in a tax system sup-
posedly designed to ensure, as far as possible, that similarly situ-
(II) a State government or any agency thereof, or
(III) a political subdivision of a State or any agency thereof, or
(iv) which is an income statement to be used for the purposes of a state-
ment or report -
(I) for credit purposes,
(II) to shareholders, or
(III) for any other substantial nontax purpose.
(B) EARNINGS AND PROFITS USED IN CERTAIN CASES. - If -
(i) a taxpayer has no applicable financial statement, or
(ii) a taxpayer has only a statement described in subparagraph (A)(iv) and the tax-
payer elects the application of this subparagraph, the net income or loss set
forth on the taxpayer's applicable financial statement shall, for purposes of par-
agraph (3)(A), be treated as being equal to the taxpayer's earnings and profits
for the taxable year (without diminution by reason of distributions during the
tax year). Such election, once made, shall remain in effect for any taxable year
for which the taxpayer is described in this subparagraph unless revoked with
the consent of the Secretary.
(C) SPECIAL RULE WHERE MORE THAN 1 STATEMENT. - For purposes of
subparagraph (A), if a taxpayer has a statement described in more than 1 clause or
subclause, the applicable financial statement shall be the statement described in the
clause or subclause with the lowest number designation.
I.R.C. § 56(f)(3).
33. See I.R.C. § 56(f)(1). For loss years beginning after December 31, 1986, the
AMT NOL is generally calculated in the same manner as for regular tax purposes under
section 172(c), with two important modifications. First, the adjustments provided in sec-
tion 56 must be applied in computing AMT NOL. Second, the preferences provided in
section 57 reduce the AMT NOL. I.R.C. § 56(d).
34. See supra note 32 to determine the financial statement a corporation should use
for BURP purposes. The highest priority financial statements are GAAP-based: (1)
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and (2) certified audited
income statements used for credit, shareholder, or any other substantial non-tax purpose.
I.R.C. § 56(f)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). These two categories encompass many corporations' state-
ments including those corporations whose shares are publicly traded.
35. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
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ated taxpayers incur equivalent income tax liabilities.36
The myriad of alternative methods under GAAP are exemplified
by the several acceptable methods for both cost apportionment
(i.e., depreciation), 37 and the valuation of inventory and cost of
goods sold. 3' The effect on financial statement income can be dra-
matically different depending on the method selected. 39 Given the
options available under GAAP for treating certain transactions,
corporations can easily select those alternatives that will minimize
the impact of the AMT amount.4° Consequently, income tax lia-
bility becomes subject to the vagaries of corporate accountants.
In addition to providing alternative accounting methods, GAAP
requires, in many cases, the application of subjective judgment.
One area in which subjective judgment becomes a factor is loss
contingencies. Under GAAP, a loss contingency can be recorded
only if (1) it is probable that an asset has been impaired, and (2) the
amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated.4 The subjective
quality of the terms "probable" and "reasonably" renders them
likely to cause disagreement among accountants whether the re-
quirements for a loss contingency are met. Another situation in-
volving judgment concerns depreciation. Under most GAAP-
based depreciation methods, accountants must estimate an asset's
useful life and residual or salvage value.42 As might be expected,
accountants often disagree over these subjective estimates. Thus,
due to items such as loss contingencies and depreciation, the
amount of income tax paid by a corporation depends in part on the
subjective judgment of its own accountants.
Due to the numerous options and the subjective elements of
GAAP, two entities with identical transactions can report very dif-
ferent financial statement incomes. If both entities are subject to
36. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
37. D. KIESO & J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 459-65 (rev. 5th ed.
1986). These alternative methods include activity methods based on either units of use or
production; straight-line methods; and decreasing charge methods such as sum-of-the-
years' digits and double declining balance. Id.
38. Id. at 333-44. These methods include specific identification; first-in, first-out; last-
in, first-out ("LIFO"); dollar-value LIFO; and average cost. Id.
39. See, e.g., D. KiEso & J. WEYGANDT, supra note 37, at 325-28, 459-62.
40. For example, "[o]ne attorney admitted that his firm may have to use different
accounting methods which, although valid under [GAAP], will reduce his firm's book
income and lessen the bite of the minimum tax." Uhlfelder, Corporate Tax Managers to
Take on New Tasks with Tax Reform, 32 TAX NOTES 942, 942 (1986).
41. Accounting for Contingencies, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
5, Para. 8 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975).
42. See D. KIEso & J. WEYGANDT, supra note 37, at 459-62.
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the corporate AMT, the AMT for each entity will differ accord-
ingly because of the disparate financial statement incomes.
This point is best illustrated by an example. Assume the follow-
ing: (1) corporations X and Y have identical financial histories and
operations; (2) both have AMTI (before the BURP adjustment)
and taxable income of zero; (3) both receive $600,000 of tax-ex-
empt interest; (4) both are made aware of a potential tort claim of
$1,200,000; (5) X reports book income of zero because it creates a
reserve for the contingent tort liability of $600,000 that offsets its
tax-exempt interest of $600,000; and (6) Y reports $600,000 of
book income because it decides not to set up a contingency reserve
for the tort liability.43
Given these assumptions, X incurs no AMT liability, but Y does,
solely because their reported book incomes differ. This result is
clearly inequitable and arises only because BURP relies on GAAP-
based financial statements. 44 In fact, the use of GAAP to deter-
mine tax liability was strongly criticized in Thor Power Tool v.
Commissioner.5  In Thor Power Tool, the Supreme Court stated
43. This example was adapted from a discussion in B. BIT-rKER & J. EUSTICE, supra
note 18, at 5-46.
44. The corporate AMT contains a minimum tax credit ("MTC") ostensibly designed
to address the inequity of such a result. See I.R.C. § 53. The effect of the MTC is that to
the extent that a corporation has AMT liability in one taxable year because of deferral
preferences, the amount of AMT liability is allowed as a credit against the corporation's
regular tax liability in appropriate subsequent years. Id. Deferral preferences arise be-
cause AMTI includes certain items of income that are deferred for regular tax purposes
and disallows certain accelerated deductions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 56(a).
There are at least two reasons why the MTC does not fully respond to the inequitable
results possible under a GAAP-based BURP adjustment. First, a corporation may al-
ways be subject to the AMT, and thus, no possibility exists for offsetting MTC against
regular tax liability. This situation may arise if a corporation has extensive net operating
losses. Second, even if a regular tax position is achieved it may not occur for several
years. Thus, the MTC ignores the time value of money.
45. 439 U.S. 522 (1979). The petitioner in Thor Power Tool was a tool manufacturer
that possessed what it considered "excess" inventory. In accordance with GAAP, the
petitioner wrote down this "excess" inventory to an amount representing net realizable
value. By offsetting this write-down against annual sales, the petitioner generated a net
operating loss for the taxable year. Id. at 524.
In disallowing the offset, the Commissioner maintained that the write-down did not
reflect income clearly for tax purposes. Id. at 537-38. The petitioner responded with two
arguments. First, the petitioner argued that there is a presumption that an inventory
practice is valid for tax purposes if it conforms with GAAP. Second, the petitioner ar-
gued that once this conformity is established by a taxpayer, the Commissioner has the
burden to establish that the GAAP-based method does not reflect income clearly. Id. at
538-39.
The Supreme Court concluded that such a presumption could not be supported in light
of the Code, case law, and the differing objectives of financial and tax accounting. Id. at
540. As a result, it affirmed the judgment of the appellate court in favor of the Commis-
sioner. Id. at 550.
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that:
Accountants long have recognized that 'generally accepted ac-
counting principles' are far from being a canonical set of rules
that will ensure identical accounting treatment of identical trans-
actions .... Variances of this sort may be tolerable in financial
reporting, but they are questionable in a tax system designed to
ensure as far as possible that similarly situated taxpayers pay the
same tax. If management's election among 'acceptable' options
were dispositive for tax purposes, a firm, indeed, could decide
unilaterally - within limits dictated only by its accountants -
the tax it wished to pay. Such unilateral decisions would not just
make the Code inequitable; they would make it unenforceable.46
In short, BURP's reliance on financial statement income is mis-
guided and leads to tax inequities.
2. Pressure on Accountants
Another significant problem with the BURP adjustment is that
it may place undue pressure on accountants to understate financial
statement income to minimize the effect of the AMT. This con-
cern has been expressed by members of the accounting profes-
sion, 47 as well as members of the legal profession. 48 To the extent
that accountants succumb to this pressure, the reliability and integ-
rity of GAAP is threatened. 49 Additionally, the pressure placed on
46. Id. at 544.
47. Uhlfelder, Earnings and Profits May Replace Book Income as AMT Preference;
SEC Will Not Lobby on Issue, 32 TAX NOTES 197, 197 (1986). For example, Albert
Ellentuck, Chairman of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, stated
that the BURP adjustment "would cause 'mischief in the accounting world and complex-
ity in the tax world' " and would "put [ ] companies in the unfortunate position of think-
ing about the tax consequences, rather than the accounting consequences, of their actions
and may cause a distortion of book income." Id. Ira H. Shapiro, the Director of the
National Tax Office of Coopers & Lybrand, argued that the BURP adjustment "'may
cause companies to resist adopting a new accounting principle or changing to a GAAP
method of reporting, even though the application of the new principle or accounting
method would provide shareholders, creditors and other users of financial statements
with more complete and accurate information.'" Id. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") expressed these same concerns. Id. After debate, however, the Chair-
man and four commissioners of the SEC decided not to send a letter to the congressional
tax-writing committee asking that they drop the BURP adjustment. Id. This decision
was apparently based on a desire to avoid getting involved in a dispute with the Internal
Revenue Service and the Treasury regarding jurisdiction. Id. at 198.
48. For example, a report by the Committees on Alternative Minimum Tax and Cor-
porations of the New York State Bar Association Tax Section stated that "[w]e are...
concerned that [the BURP adjustment] would place an undesirable pressure on account-
ants and the accounting system generally. The provision would create an obvious incen-
tive for companies to reduce their book income." Committees on AMT, supra note 18, at
570.
49. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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accountants directly affects the BURP adjustment: if accountants
understate financial statement income, then the BURP adjustment
decreases. Therefore, aside from tax inequities, BURP is likely to
distort financial reporting because of the pressure it places on
accountants.
One commentator has argued that concerns about pressure on
accountants should not be overemphasized because they are offset
by the pressure placed on corporations to reflect high earnings for
shareholders and creditors. 0 This argument, however, ignores two
important points. First, shareholder pressure does not apply to
most privately-held corporations. These corporations are more
concerned with minimizing taxes and maximizing shareholder re-
turn than in reporting high earnings. Second, countervailing pres-
sure from creditors similarly may be absent. Although lenders
may consider reported earnings, lenders focus primarily upon the
soundness of the borrowing corporation's cash flow statements,
projections, and balance sheet. Thus, a privately-held corporation
may not be compelled to report high earnings even if it needs to
borrow. Accordingly, the pressure on accountants to understate
financial income is particularly great in privately-held corpora-
tions. Even in publicly-held corporations, it is unlikely that the
countervailing pressure to reflect high earnings will exactly offset
the pressure placed on accountants." To the extent that the pres-
sures do not completely offset, distorted financial reporting will
result.
3. Compliance Problems
The BURP adjustment causes a further concern because of its
compliance cost implications. Compliance costs will undoubtedly
increase because corporations will be forced to maintain an addi-
tional set of books for AMT purposes. Moreover, the complexities
of the AMT will cause corporations to hire additional accountants,
outside experts, or both.5 2 These compliance costs may prove pro-
50. Gould, supra note 2, at 795. Gould stated that "[i]t is unlikely that publicly held
companies will reduce the strength of their financial statements to avoid tax. Leveraged
companies or companies attempting to borrow will not be able to engage in such financial
reporting distortions." Id.
51. Committees on AMT, supra note 18, at 570. The Committees stated that "it
seems a vain hope that the conflict between the tax incentive to report lower earnings and
a purported desire to reflect higher earnings will produce an appropriate calculation of a
firm's economic income." Id.
52. An oil and gas industry official asserted that the BURP adjustment will cause" 'a
tremendous increase in our tax department's workload and an increase in the workload of
companies that supply our data.' " Uhlfelder, supra note 40, at 942.
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hibitive for smaller corporations, driving many marginal corpora-
tions out of business.53
Compliance may also pose a problem for the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") from an administrative and budgetary standpoint.
The BURP adjustment may force the IRS to examine critically a
corporation's financial statements and restate them in certain situa-
tions.54 Such critical review will be time consuming and will re-
quire the IRS to thoroughly train its auditors in GAAP. Given an
already overburdened audit staff and budget constraints, it is ques-
tionable whether the IRS can effectively police the BURP
adjustment.55
C. The ACE Adjustment
The ACE adjustment is equal to seventy-five percent of the dif-
ference between the corporation's AMTI and its ACE.5 6 ACE is
defined as the corporation's AMTI, as adjusted in accordance with
53. Feinberg & Robinson, supra note 2, at 36. Another commentator has stated that:
Undoubtedly, small closely held corporations will have difficulty in complying
with the administrative requirements underlying the several determinations that
must be made and the multitude of records that must be maintained [for AMT
purposes]. Moreover, even the most sophisticated corporate taxpayer may have
difficulty in working with the complexities of certain concepts contained in the
corporate [AMT].
Gould, supra note 2, at 783-84.
54. The temporary regulations for the BURP adjustment set forth rules requiring
specified adjustments to net book income to prevent the omission or duplication of items
of net book income. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.56-IT(d)(4) (1987). In addition, the tempo-
rary regulations allow the Commissioner to approve or require other adjustments to a
corporation's net book income to prevent omission or duplication of items. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.56-IT(d)(4)(i) (1987). To the extent that the IRS exercises this authority, it will
clearly require critical review of corporate financial statements.
55. The corporate AMT with the BURP adjustment:
Will require that IRS auditors become expert[s] in the rules of accounting to
critically examine a [corporation's] accounting books and records .... Accept-
ance of this invitation to widespread surveillance of all documents by the IRS
provokes troubling policy questions as well as practical concerns about the abil-
ity of the auditing staff to cope with the increased time demands in a time of
budget crisis.
Feinberg & Robinson, supra note 2, at 35-36.
56. I.R.C. § 56(g)(1). The use of seventy-five percent - as opposed to fifty percent
- may be due to the "inclusion of the negative adjustment for ACE and from the fact
that ACE is smaller than [BURP]." Gould, supra note 2, at 790 n.69 (summarizing a
speech by David Garlock, former Associate Legislative Counsel for the Treasury).
Unlike the BURP adjustment, the ACE adjustment can be either a positive or negative
number. If the adjustment is negative, it is allowed so long as it does not generate a
cumulative negative adjustment. See I.R.C. § 56(g)(2)(B). Thus, the reduction to AMTI
is limited to the excess of the aggregate amount by which AMTI has been increased by
the ACE adjustment in prior taxable years less the aggregate amount of reductions taken
in prior years. Id.
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Code section 56(g)(4).- 7 The primary adjustments to AMTI relate
to depreciation, items included for purposes of computing earnings
and profits ("E & P"), items disallowed in computing E & P, and
Code section 312(n) adjustments.58
Calculation of the depreciation adjustment initially requires a
corporation to divide its depreciable property into the following
four categories: (1) property placed in service after 1989; (2) prop-
erty to which the new accelerated cost recovery system ("ACRS")
applies; (3) property to which the original ACRS system applies;
and (4) property placed in service before 1981. 59 A corporation
must then compute depreciation for each category based on a stat-
utorily prescribed method. 6° Finally, depreciation for ACE pur-
poses is determined by comparing depreciation as computed under
the method specified by the statute with depreciation used for book
purposes, and selecting the method which yields deductions having
the smaller present value.6' Obviously, these procedures will be
very difficult and time-consuming.
The difficulty and time involved are compounded by the other
adjustments. The second adjustment relates to items which are ex-
cluded from gross income for AMTI purposes, but are included in
determining E & P. 62 These items are taken into account for ACE
purposes, and thus AMTI must be adjusted accordingly.63
Items disallowed in computing E & P represent the third adjust-
ment.64 In effect, items deducted in arriving at AMTI which are
not deductible for computing E & P must be added back when
determining ACE.65
57. See I.R.C. § 56(g)(3). See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the adjustments contained in I.R.C. § 56(g)(4).
58. I.R.C. §§ 56(g)(4)(A)-(D).
59. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(A).
60. Id.
61. I.R.C. §§ 56(g)(4)(A)(i), 56(g)(4)(A)(v).
62. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(B)(i).
63. Id. An example of such an adjustment is the interest on tax-exempt bonds. The
adjustment is reduced by any deduction that would have been allowable had the amount
actually been includable in gross income. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(B)(i)(II). Thus, interest in-
curred to purchase tax-exempt bonds, for example, would be subtracted from the interest
on the bonds in determining the adjustment. Other examples include the inside build-up
in life insurance contracts reduced by premiums attributable to the insurance coverage
and income on annuity contracts. I.R.C. §§ 56(g)(4)(B)(ii)-(iii); see also I.R.C.
§§ 7702(g), 72(u)(2).
64. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(C)(i).
65. Id. An example of an item that must be added back is the dividends received
deduction. There are special rules, however, governing certain dividends which qualify
for the one-hundred percent dividend received deduction and dividends from certain sec-
tion 936 corporations. I.R.C. §§ 56(g)(4)(C)(ii)-(iii); see also I.R.C. § 936.
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Finally, AMTI is adjusted according to most of the E & P com-
putational rules of Code section 312(n).66 These rules include ad-
justments for construction period carrying costs, intangible drilling
costs, certain amortization provisions, LIFO inventory adjust-
ments, and installment sales. 67  As a result of the extensive and
complicated adjustments required to arrive at ACE, the calculation
of the corporate AMT becomes excessively burdensome.
Despite its complexity, the ACE adjustment cures two of the
problems presented by the BURP adjustment. In contrast to
BURP, the ACE adjustment derives from AMTI rather than finan-
cial statement income. Consequently, ACE eliminates the con-
cerns of BURP raised by the limitations and shortcomings of
GAAP, and the consequent pressure that BURP places on ac-
countants to understate financial statement income.68
Although the ACE adjustment eliminates some problems associ-
ated with the BURP adjustment, the ACE adjustment heightens
the compliance concerns inherent in the BURP adjustment. Both
BURP and ACE require one set of tax records for regular tax pur-
poses and another set for AMT purposes; otherwise, the informa-
tional requirements for the BURP and ACE adjustments differ.
Generally, to arrive at the BURP adjustment, the only additional
information required (e.g., financial statement or book income) is
contained in financial statements that most corporations already
maintain for other purposes. This is not the case for the ACE ad-
justment. Instead, a corporation must independently develop the
66. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(D)(i). The Code, however, specifies a number of limits on the
application of the section 312(n) rules. I.R.C. §§ 56(g)(4)(D)(i)(I)-(V). In addition, there
is a special rule for intangible drilling costs and mineral exploration and development
costs. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(D)(ii).
67. See I.R.C. § 312(n). In addition to these four primary adjustments, there are
three other adjustments of more limited application. The first relates to the exchange of
debt pools. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(E). When a corporation realizes a loss on the exchange of
one pool of debt obligations for another, the loss is not recognized for ACE purposes so
long as the effective interest rates and maturities of the two pools are substantially the
same. Id.
The second adjustment concerns the acquisition expenses of life insurance companies.
I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(f). Generally speaking, the acquisition expenses of life insurance com-
panies are to be capitalized and amortized for ACE purposes in accordance with GAAP.
Id.
The third adjustment of limited application applies to certain ownership changes.
I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(H). If a corporation experiences an ownership change within the mean-
ing of section 382 after the enactment date of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the
aggregate adjusted basis of its assets exceeds the net fair market value of its stock, then
the adjusted basis of each asset will be limited, for ACE purposes, to its proportionate
share of the value of the stock. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 382.
68. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
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information for the extensive adjustments needed to determine
ACE.6 9 As a result, corporations will be forced to generate a third
set of tax records just for ACE purposes.
Additionally, the ACE adjustment is much more complex than
the BURP adjustment. With the BURP adjustment, much of the
complexity revolves around the calculation of AMTI. In comput-
ing the ACE adjustment, however, determination of AMTI is at
most a "half-way" point. To arrive at ACE, numerous additional
computations will have to be made.7"
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR COPING WITH CORPORATE
TAX AVOIDANCE
The current corporate AMT structure, including the special ad-
justment approach of BURP and ACE, represents only one way to
address the problem of corporate tax avoidance. Less obtrusive
means are also available.7 ' The most drastic, but nonetheless the
most streamlined and logical approach, would be to eliminate the
corporate minimum tax and deal directly with the problem at its
source by purging the Code of tax preferences. A less dramatic
proposal would eliminate the BURP and ACE adjustments from
the minimum tax structure, resulting ultimately in a minimum tax
based solely on tax preferences.
A. Eliminate the Corporate Minimum Tax
By Eliminating Preferences
The corporate minimum tax represents a conceptual anomaly,
rather than a structural necessity in the tax system. This complex
tax exists wholly apart from the regular tax structure, and was
added mainly to provide Congress with a politically palatable and
69. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
71. Arguably, the BURP and ACE adjustments could be modified to eradicate some
of their inherent problems. As an example, the overall complexity of the AMT structure
could be reduced slightly by basing the AMT solely on the ACE adjustment. This would
eliminate the need to compute the specifically enumerated adjustments and preferences.
These adjustments and preferences would not escape taxation because, with the exception
of the AMT NOL deduction, they are included in the ACE adjustment. Obviously, there
are other numerous possibilities for superficial modification. Realistically, however, no
individual change or combination of changes is likely to cure the major defects in the
BURP and ACE adjustments without attacking the basic nature of the adjustment itself.
For example, the only way to eliminate most of BURP's inherent problems would be to
remove its reliance on financial statement (or book) income. Yet, this reliance is the very
essence of the BURP adjustment. Consequently, this Article does not consider a modi-
fied BURP or ACE adjustment as a serious alternative for coping with the problem of
corporate tax avoidance.
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feasible way to curb tax avoidance.7 2 Simply put, the corporate
minimum tax system allows Congress to indirectly tax that which
it is not willing to tax directly. However, employing this indirect
approach forces Congress to forego the most logical alternative for
coping with the tax avoidance problem: dealing directly with the
problem by focusing on its source.
Congress could cure the tax avoidance problem by eliminating
the various deductions, credits, and exclusions which originally
generated the tax avoidance problem. Such an across-the-board
cutback in tax preferences was proposed by Fortney H. Stark, a
member of the Ways and Means Committee,73 and was the ap-
proach taken by the Treasury in a 1984 report to President Rea-
gan.74 The Treasury's plan embodied in the report did not provide
for a corporate minimum tax because it attacked the problem of
tax avoidance directly by proposing the elimination of most tax
preferences. Congress, however, rejected the plan as politically
infeasible. 7"
B. A Minimum Tax Based Solely on Preferences
The elimination of the corporate minimum tax is not likely to
occur because of political factors. Therefore, the next best alterna-
tive would be for Congress to eliminate the BURP and ACE ad-
justments from the corporate minimum tax structure. The
primary goal in developing the corporate minimum tax was to pre-
72. See, e.g., Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative Mini-
mum Tax, 66 TAXES 91, 93 (1988) ("[the minimum tax has] greater political appeal...
than proposals for the direct reduction of preferences"); Aaron & Galper, The Politics of
Tax Reform, 30 TAX NOTES 49, 49 (1986) ("[v]igorous, intelligent, and well-paid lobby-
ists beset members of Congress with arguments that one particular tax provision or an-
other is vital to the nation and that the campaign contributions over which the lobbyist
has influence are vital to that member's reelection"); Haskell, Tax Reform, 35 TAX
NOTES 301, 302 (1987) (implying that Congress failed to reduce or eliminate tax prefer-
ences due to pressure placed on it by various industries); Brannon, The Corporate Mini-
mum Tax, 30 TAX NOTES 269, 269 (1986) ("[tlhe root of the problem is that Congress
feels slightly uncomfortable with some of the preference items in current law [, but]
[t]here is not enough reform muscle to repeal these provisions"); Sunley, Thinking About
Senator Packwood's Alternative Minimum Tax for Corporations, 31 TAX NOTES 395, 398
(1986) ("[ffor members [of Congress] who oppose tax incentives, it is an indirect way of
[cutting back] on them. For members who favor tax incentives, it is a way of preserving
them for many taxpayers while at the same time giving the members a possible response
when constituents ask why certain profitable companies are permitted to pay little or no
U.S. income tax.").
73. Brannon, supra note 72, at 269.
74. 2 The Treasury Department Report to the President, Tax Reform for Fairness,
Simplicity, and Economic Growth 131-32 (1984).
75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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vent corporations from eliminating or dramatically reducing their
income tax liabilities through the use of tax preferences.7 6 The
BURP and ACE adjustments represent Congress' indirect and ex-
tremely complex techniques for attaining that goal.
A simpler and more direct means exists for achieving the corpo-
rate minimum tax's main objective; specifically, the minimum tax
base could be redefined to include whatever preferences are neces-
sary to ensure that profitable corporations pay their fair share of
income taxes. To implement this approach, Congress could mod-
ify the current AMT structure by eliminating the BURP and ACE
adjustments from the AMTI base, and replacing them with spe-
cific, appropriate preferences. Alternatively, Congress could util-
ize an add-on minimum tax structure by expanding the prior add-
on minimum tax base through the addition of selected preferences.
Under either option, corporations would incur a minimum tax to
the extent they utilize tax preferences.
There are, however, practical difficulties with a minimum tax
based solely on tax preferences. In establishing the BURP and
ACE adjustments, Congress rejected a minimum tax derived en-
tirely from tax preferences.77 Congress concluded that such a sys-
tem failed to define a comprehensive income base and inadequately
measured economic income.78
Congress' conclusions are questionable. A minimum tax based
solely on tax preferences would define a broad base of income as
long as all significant exclusions, deductions, and credits were in-
cluded in the minimum tax base. Likewise, the inclusion of all sig-
nificant preferences in the minimum tax base would result in a
fairly accurate measurement of economic income. Admittedly, a
minimum tax based entirely on tax preferences would result in a
lengthy list of items for inclusion in the minimum tax base. None-
theless, this approach is simple and direct, in dramatic contrast to
the special adjustment approach of BURP and ACE.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress could completely remedy the corporate tax avoidance
problem if it repealed the corporate minimum tax and dealt di-
rectly with the source of the problem by eliminating the various tax
preferences contained in the Code. This approach is the most logi-
76. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 519; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 306-
07.
77. Id.
78. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 519; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 306-07.
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cal and direct solution to the tax avoidance problem. Unfortu-
nately, due to political factors, the direct approach is probably not
feasible.
The next best alternative would be for Congress to eliminate the
BURP and ACE adjustments from the minimum tax structure. In
place of BURP and ACE, Congress could add additional appropri-
ate preferences to the minimum tax base. This would ensure that
corporations pay their fair share of income taxes. In contrast to
the BURP and ACE adjustments, such an approach would provide
a relatively simple and direct solution to the problem of corporate
tax avoidance.
